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NOTES
IMMIGRATION LAW-THE PENDENCY OF A MOTION TO REo
PEN BEFORE THE BOARD OF IMMIGRATION ApPEALS AND ITS EF
FECT ON ApPELLATE COURT JURISDICTION: REJECTING THE
"SUSPENDED FINALITY" ApPROACH IN DEPORTATION CASES
INTRODUCTION
Deportation is the process by which the government expels
aliens from the United States. 1 The Board of Immigration Appeals
("BIA" or "Board")2 is the administrative agency that issues the
required "final" orders of deportation. 3 The deportable alien may
1. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 438 (6th ed. 1990).
2. The Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") is an administrative appeals body
under the Attorney General. The BIA and the immigration judges comprise the Exec
utive Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR") in the Department of Justice. The BIA
is not a part of the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"). 8 C.F.R. § 3.1
(1994); see generally T. ALEINIKOFF & D. MARTIN, IMMIGRATION: PROCESS AND POL
ICY 92 (1985). This BIA independence "is crucial to both the reality and the perception
of fairness, because the INS is one of the two adversarial parties appearing before the
BIA in a given case." Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices for the Review of Agency
Adjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IOWA L. REv. 1297, 1378 (1986).
The immigration regulations define the Board's jurisdiction. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(b).
3. A basic premise of this Note is that an immigration judge's deportation deci
sion becomes a final, appealable order of deportation once it is affirmed by the BIA.
See infra note 55 and accompanying text for a discussion of the pertinent immigration
regulations. Because this Note addresses only the narrow issue of whether an unadjudi
cated motion to reopen or reconsider suspends the finality of a BIA decision for pur
poses of appellate jurisdiction, it does not consider the full range of decisions
appealable under § 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.c.
§ 1105a(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Note, however, that the United States Supreme Court has discussed the meaning of
"final orders" of deportation that are appealable to the courts of appeals. See' INS v.
Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 938 (1983) (holding that "the term 'final orders' in § 106(a) 'in
cludes all matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent,'" not just those
decisions made at the deportation hearing) (quoting Chadha v. INS, 634 F.2d 408, 412
(1980»; Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, 392 U.S. 206, 211 (1968) (denial of a motion to stay
deportation not included under § 106(a) jurisdiction); Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S. 18
(1964) (per curiam) (jurisdiction included reviewing denials of motions to reopen de
portation proceedings); Foti v. INS, 375 U.S. 217, 229. (1963) (orders reviewable under
§ 106(a) include "all determinations made during and incident to" the deportation pro
ceeding, and reviewable by the BIA). For a more complete discussion of what consti
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administratively challenge a deportation order by filing a motion to
reopen with the Board. 4 Generally, a pending motion to reopen
renders an agency decision nonfina1.5 Appellate courts sometimes
refer to this rule as the "suspended finality" rule,6 because the final
ity of an agency's order is suspended until the. disposition of a mo
tion to reopen. This rule, however, creates certain problems when
applie':i in the context' ofimmigration law.
.
Under section 106(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act?
("INA"), aliens faced with a final order of deportation may also fili!
a petition for review in a court of appeals. s This request for judicial
review may even be sought simultaneously with a motion to re<?pen
deportation proceedings. If the motion to reopen has not beeri
ruled upon at the time of the judicial review petition, at least two
possible scenarios exist: (1) concurrent jurisdiction, with the mo
tion pending before the BIA and the petition for judicial review
pending before the appellate court, or (2) lack of appellate court
jurisdiction, where the court concludes that the pending motion to
reopen suspends the finality of the otherwise final order of deporta
tion. A nonfinal order cannot be appealed to a court. 9
tutes a final order of deportation in the federal courts, see Glenn A.. Guarino,
Annotation, What Constitutes "Final Deportation Order" Appealable to United States
Court ofAppeals Under § 106 of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 USCS § 1I05a), 65
A.L.R. FED. 742 (1983).
In sum, final orders issued during deportation proceedings, and reviewable by the
United States courts of appeals, include the initial determination of deportability as
well as ancillary orders on related matters. See 3 CHARLES GORDON & STANLEY MAIL
MAN, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 81.05[3][b], at 81-84 (1994). A final order
of deportation is "the ultimate result of the [deportation] proceeding," the "principal
ingredient" of which is the initial finding of deportability. Foti, 375 U.S. at 229. "Final
orders" can encompass other decisions, such as a subsequent denial of discretionary
relief. Id. at 231. Changes in the administrative regulations can expand the "decisional
content" of the orders reviewable by the United States courts of appeals. Id. at 230
n.16.
4. See infra note 31 for the text of the immigration regulations authorizing mo
tions to reopen and motions to reconsider; 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.2, 3.8 (1994). Although mo
tions to reopen and motions to reconsider are different, they are treated as
interchangeable for purposes of this Note's analysis. Hereinafter, the term "motion to
reopen" also refers to a motion to reconsider unless stated otherwise.
5. See infra notes 21-24 and accompanying text for a discussion of the general
rule that an unadjudicated motion to reopen or to reconsider renders an administrative
order nonfinal.
6. See, e.g., White v. INS, 6 F.3d 1312, 1317 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct.
2162 (1994).
7. 8 U.S.c. §§ 1101-1525 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
8. See infra note 44 and accompanying text for background on INA § 106(a).
9. Finality is a jurisdictional requirement. See infra note 17 and accompanying
text.
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The difficulty here is that deportation requires a final order. If
an unadjudicated motion to reopen suspends the finality of the de
portation decision, an' alien could effectively delay his or her depor
tation by filing such motions.lO However, Congress sought to avoid
such abuse of the deportation process when it amended the judicial
review provisions of th~ INA.ll
The United States courts of appeals are divided as to whether
they may exercise jurisdiction over an aggrieved alien's case if a
motion to reopen is pending when the alien seeks judicial review.
Some courts conclude that an unadjudicated motion to reopen ren
ders the Board's decision nonfinal and, therefore, nonapp~alable.12
Other courts, seeking to prevent the use of "dilatory tactic[s1 to
postpone the executi~n of deportation orders,"13 hold that such a
pending motion does not suspend the finality of the deportation or
der. 14 Therefore, the order is reviewable if an appeal is filed within
the 90-day period for seeking judicial review. IS
The circuit split raises th~ question of whether an unadjudi
cated motion to reopen should suspend the finality of a deportation
order. This Note examines the strengths and weaknesses of the sus
pended finality rule and finds the rule incompatible with immigra
tion law.
Section I discusses the general rule in administrative law that
orders under reconsideration are nonfinal. This section also
presents basic immigration policy concerns. Section II reviews the
relevant decisions of the various United States courts of appeals
that have considered the issue of whether motions to reopen sus
pend the finality of deportation orders. Section III analyzes the
competing strengths and weaknesses of the different courts of ap
10. See infra notes 115-22 and accompanying text for the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit's view, White v. INS, 6 F.3d 1312, 1316-17 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. de
nied, 114 S. Ct. 2162 (1994), of how aliens can abuse the deportation process and other
problems with suspended finality.
11. See infra notes 44-45 and accompanying text for legislative history of.
§ l06(a).
12. See, e.g., FJeary V. INS, 950 F.2d 711, 713 (11th Cir. 1992); Chu v. INS, 875
F.2d 777, 779-80 (9th Cir. 1989); Hyun Joon Chung v. INS, 720 F.2d 1471, 1474 (9th CiT.
1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216 (1984).
13. Alleyne v. INS, 879 F.2d 1177, 1181 (3d CiT. 1989).
14. See, e.g., Stone v. INS, 13 F.3d 934, 939 (6th CiT.), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2098
(1994); Bauge v. INS, 7 F.3d 1540,1542 (10th CiT. 1993); White v. INS, 6 F.3d 1312,1317
(8th CiT. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2162 (1994); Akrap v. INS, 966 F.2d 267, 271 (7th
CiT. 1992); Rhoa-ZamoTa v. INS, 971 F.2d 26, 33 (7thCir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
1943 (1993) and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2331 (1993); Alleyne, 879 F.2d at 1181.
15. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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peals views, and concludes that the suspended finality rule conflicts
with the immigration regulations and underlying policy concerns.
Thus, the approach of courts that reject the suspended fimility rule
should be followed: appellate jurisdiction is appropriate despite an
unadjudicated motion to reopen before the BIA. This Note con
cludes that it is both disruptive and premature to classify a de~ision
as "nonfinal" on account of the filing of a motion to reopen.
I.

A.

BACKGROUND

Finality of Administrative Orders and the Rule of Locomotive
Engineers

"Final agency action"16 is a jurisdictional prerequisite to judi
cial review of an administrative order,17 In Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers,ls the United
States Supreme Court stated that as a general rule, administrative
orders under reconsideration are not final. I9 According to the
16. See generally 2 KENNETH C. DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRA
TIVE LAW TREATISE § 15.11, at 355 (3d ed. 1994) (citing 5 U.S.c. § 704 (1988)).
17. See, e.g., Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. FTC, 814 F.2d 731, 745-46 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
(noting that "finality is, where applicable, a jurisdictional requirement") (citing Bell v.
New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773, 777-80 (1983); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 326-28
(1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 766 (1975)). "The core question is whether
the agency has completed its decisionmaking process, and whether the result ... will
directly affect the parties." Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2773 (1992).
18. 482 U.S. 270 (1987).
19. Id. at 284-85. Locomotive Engineers arose out of a railroad merger and its
resulting labor dispute. On April 4, 1983, the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
("BLE") filed a "Petition. for Clarification," claiming that the Interstate Commerce
Commission ("ICC") lacked jurisdiction over labor matters and asking the ICC to de
clare that its earlier order did not authorize tenant rail carriers to use their own crews
on certain routes. The ICC denied the petition for clarification on May 18, 1983. Id. at
275.
Within the period for seeking administrative review, BLE and another union filed
a motion for reconsideration of the ICC's refusal to clarify. [d. at 276. Reconsideration
was denied on October 25, 1983. The unions petitioned for judicial review of the May
18 and October 25 orders, which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
vacated. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. ICC, 761 F.2d 714 (D.C. Cir. 1985), cert.
granted, 475 U.S. 1081 (1986).
The Court held that the ICC's denial of reconsideration was an unreviewable or
der. Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. at 277. The Court distinguished between motions
.based on "material error," which raise the same issue that could have been raised on
appeal from the original order, and those based on "new evidence" or "changed circum
stances," which are reviewable. Id. at 278-79. Where a petitioner seeks reconsideration
on the ground of material error, on the same record that was originally before the
agency, "'an order which merely denies rehearing of ... [the prior] order is not itself
reviewable.'" [d. at 280 (quoting Microwave Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 515 F.2d
385, 387 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1974)).
.
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Court, an unadjudicated motion to reopen suspends the finality of
an administrative agency decision. 20 If filed within the statutory
time for seeking judicial review, the motion to reopen tolls the pe
riod for seeking judicial review of the original order.21 The underThe Court next considered the Hobbs Act, 28 u.s.c. §§ 2341-2344 (1982), which
permits aggrieved parties to seek judicial review of final ICC orders within 60 days of
the order's entry. Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. at 277. The Court held that although
BLE's appeal from the May 18 order was filed more than 60 days from the date of the
order, the petition for judicial review was effective, because the seasonable motion for
administrative reconsideration tolled the running of the Hobbs Act limitation period
until the ICC's disposition of the motion. Id. at 284. See infra note 24, discussing how
the Court reached this conclusion.
The Court further held, however, that despite the stay of the appeals period, the
refusal to clarify was not an appealable order. Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. at 285.
First, BLE was not aggrieved within the meaning of the Hobbs Act. Id. Second, even if
the petition for clarification was treated as a motion to reopen, the denial was still not
reviewable because BLE failed to bring any new evidence or changed circumstances.
"[I]t merely urged the Commission to correct what BLE thought to be a serious error of
law. That should have been sought many months earlier, by an appeal from the original
order." Id. at 286. The Court therefore dismissed the review petitions for lack of juris
diction. Id. at 287. Thus, the Court's proposition, that the filing of a motion to recon
sider or to reopen suspends the finality of an agency order and tolls the statutory time
period in which to appeal, was stated as a general rule, without regard to the particular
facts of this case.
20. Id. at 284-85.
21. Whether the filing of a motion to reopen tolls the period in which to appeal,
and whether the deportation order is appealable while the motion is unadjudicated, are
separate issues. Thus, the jurisdiction issue discussed in this Note must not be confused
with the closely related question of timeliness in filing appeals. See id. (filing of motion
to reopen or reconsider renders administrative agency's decision nonfinal and tolls the
statute for purposes of determining when the time to appeal to the court begins); accord
Arch Mineral Corp. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 798 F.2d
215 (7th Cir. 1986). Some courts have extended the rule of Locomotive Engineers to
hold that a motion to reopen renders the order nonfinal for purposes of appellate juris
diction. See United Transp. Union v. ICC, 871 F.2d 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (motion for
reconsideration filed by labor union after ICC's decision rendered that decision nonfi
nal as to union and not reviewable by court); West Penn Power Co. v. EPA, 860 F.2d
581, 587-88 (3d Cir. 1988) (court held it did not have jurisdiction over petition for re
view when motion to reconsider was pending; court could not distinguish between the
concept of finality for purposes of triggering the running of a time limit for appeals with
the concept of finality for the purpose of appellate jurisdiction); Winter v. ICC, 851
F.2d 1056, 1062 (8th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 925 (1988) (union's petition to
reopen rendered ICC's decision nonfinal). But see Northside Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v.
Thomas, 804 F.2d 371 (7th Cir. 1986) (holding that pending motion had no effect on
appellate court's jurisdiction). However, Northside's value as precedent is diminished
because the court explicitly relied on American Trucking Associations v. ICC, 697 F.2d
1146 (D.C. Cir. 1983). The American Trucking court stated that 5 U.S.C. § 704 explic
itly permits judicial review and a request for agency reconsideration to be sought simul
taneously. 697 F.2d at 1148 n.·. After Locomotive Engineers, American Trucking may
no longer be viable, but the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit left that question
unanswered after concluding that "the rule of Locomotive Engineers does not apply in
the immigration context, whatever its effect on administrative law generally." Rhoa
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lying order is then appealable after the motion for reconsideration
is denied. 22
This result, however, seems to conflict with the plain language
of 5 U.S.c. § 704,23 which states that agency action is final for pur
poses of judicial review "whether or not" there has been a motion
to reconsider or to reopen. 24 Despite this plain language, the Loco
motive Engineers Court remarked that section 704 "has long been
construed ... merely to relieve parties from the requirement of petiZamora v. INS, 971 F.2d 26, 32 n.5 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1943 (1993)
and cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2331 (1993). For discussions of the tolling issue, see Marilyn
Mann, Note, Timeliness of Petitions for Judicial Review Under Section 106(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act, 86 MICH. L. REv. 990 (1988); Kirk LPeterson, Note,
"Final" Orders of Deportation, Motions to Reopen and Reconsider, and Tolling Under
the Judicial Review Provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 79 IOWA L. REV.
439 (1994).
22. Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. at 284-85; see also Arch Mineral Corp. v. Direc
tor, Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 798 F.2d 215, 218 (7th Cir. 1986).
Timeliness and jurisdiction are technically separate issues; see supra note 2l.
23. See infra note 24 for the text of 5 U.S.c. § 704 (1988). Courts and commenta
tors continue to refer to this section as § 10(c) of the Administ~ative Procedure Act
("APA"). See, e.g., Darbyv.Cisneros, 113 S. Ct. 2539 (1993). However, § iO(c) was
repealed in 1966. Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-544, 80 Stat. 392.
24. The APA is a general default scheme for review of agency action, relied on by
courts if an enabling statute does not already provide for a review procedure. Section
106(a) of the INA provides for the judicial review of final deportation orders. See 8
U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1988 &Supp. V 1993), infra note 44. Section 704 reads in full:
Agency action made reviewable by statute and final' agency action for which
there is no other adequate remedy in a court are subject to judicial review. A
preliminary, procedural, or intermediate agency action or'ruling not directly
reviewable is subject to review on the review of the final agency action. Ex
cept as otherwise expressly required by statute, agency action otherwise final is
final for the purposes of this section whether or not there has been presented or
determined an application for a declaratory order, for any form of reconsidera
tions [sic], or, unless the agency otherwise requires by rule and provides that
the action meanwhile is inoperative, for an appeal to superior agency
authority.
5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988) (emphasis added). This language is similar to language of the
Hobbs Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2341-2351 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), and of the Interstate Com
merce Act ("ICA"), 49 U.S.C. §§ 10301-10388 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), which provides
that "[n]otwithstanding" the ability of the ICC to reopen and reconsider its orders, "an
action of the Commission ... is final on the date on which it is served." 49 U.S.C.
§ 10327(i) (1988). The Locomotive Engineers Court noted that this language suggests
that a pending motion to reconsider does not suspend the, finality of an ICC order "for
purposes of triggering the Hobbs Act limitations period." 482 U.S. at 284.
Historically, however, courts have instead construed this ~anguage so that a motion
to reopen or reconsider defeats the finality of the underlying agency order and tolls the
period in which to petition for judicial review. Given this historical treatment, and the
lack of any "basis for distinguishing the language of [the ICA] from that of § 704," the
Court concluded that the filing of a motion to reopen or reconsider rendered the under
lying ICC order nonfinal. Id. at 284-85.
.
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tioning for rehearing before seeking judicial review."25 However,
when a motion to reopen is actually filed, such motion suspends the
finality of the order to which it is directed. 26 This rule is founded
"on a notion of judicial economy."27 It is a waste of judicial re
sources to hear appeals from administrative action that may be
checked by the agency on reconsideration. 28
·In the immigration context, however, Congress decided that ju
dicial economy is secondary to the goal of curbing intentional abuse
of the deportation process. For policy reasons, five United States
courts of appeals now find the rule of Locomotive Engineers incom
patible with the goals of immigration law.29
B.

General Immigration Policy Concerns

The principal immigration policy goals include preventing re
petitive appeals, preventing frivolous and dilatory appeals, avoiding
delay of deportation, and providing fairness to aliens. 3D This sub
section is divided into three parts. The first part discusses the regu
lations authorizing motions to reopen and motions to reconsider.
The second part discusses judicial review under the INA, and the
third part reviews the immigration regulations that implement con
gressional policy.
1.

Motions to Reopen and Motions to Reconsider

The administrative regulations authorize both motions to reo
pen and motions to reconsider. 31 .These motions serve entirely dif
25. [d. See supra note 24.
26. Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. at 284-85. See also Civil Aeronautics Bd. v.
Delta Air Lines, 367 U.S. 316, 326 (1961) (referring to "the general notion that an
administrative order is not 'final,' for the purposes of judicial review, until outstanding
petitions for reconsideration have been disposed of'); West Penn Power Co. v. EPA,
860 F.2d 581, 583 (3d Cir. 1988) (court held it did not have jurisdiction over a petition
for review because of a pending motion for reconsideration).
·27. Arch Mineral Corp. v. Director, Workers' Compensation Programs, 798 F.2d
215, 219 (7th Cir. 1986).
28. [d.
29. The courts of appeals for the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits
reject the rule of Locomotive Engineers; see supra note 14 for citations to the pertinent
cases. Although the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Stone v. INS, 13 F.3d 934
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2098 (1994), did not discuss Locomotive Engineers, the
issue discuSsed in each case was the same: whether the filing of a motion ·to reconsider
within the period for seeking judicial review tolls the statutory time in which to appeal
an ·order. [d. at 935.
30. Mann, supra note 21, at 1010. See also infra note 45 and accompanying text.
31. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1994) provides for both types of motions, and reads in perti
nent part:
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ferent purposes and have distinct requirements. The motion· to
reconsider is used when the petitioner challenges the administrative
agency's interpretation of the law. The motion to reopen is used to
bring new, previously unavailable evidence before the administra
tive agency.32 These motions may ·be made at any time prior to an
The Board may on its' own motion reopen or reconsider any case in which
it has rendered a decision. Reopening or reconsideration of any case in which
a decision has been made by the Board, whether requested by the Commis
sioner or any other duly authorized officer of the Service, or by the party af
fected by the decision, shall be only upon written motion to the Board.
Motions to reopen in deportation proceedings shall not be granted unless it
appears to the Board that evidence sought to be offered is material and was
not available and could not have been discovered or presented at the former
hearing; nor shall any motion to reopen for the purpose of affording the alien
an opportunity to apply for any form of discretionary relief be granted if it
appears that the alien's right to apply for such relief was fully explained to him
and an opportunity to apply therefor was afforded him at the former hearing
unless the relief is sought on the basis of circumstances which have arisen sub
sequent to the hearing. A motion to reopen or a motion to reconsider shall
not be made by or in behalf of a person who is the subject of deportation
proceedings subsequent to his departure from the United States. Any depar
ture from the United States of a person who is the subject of deportation pro
ceedings occurring after the making of a motion to reopen or a motion to
reconsider shall constitute a withdrawal of such motion.

Id.
8 C.F.R. § 3.8(a) (1994) governs the form of each motion and reads in pertinent
part:
Motions to reopen shall state the new facts to be proved at the reopened hear
ing and shall be supported by affidavits or other evidentiary material. Motions
to reconsider shall state the reasons upon which the motion is based and shall
be supported by such precedent decisions as are pertinent. In any case in
which a deportation order is in effect, there shall be included in the motion to
reopen or reconsider such order a statement by or on behalf of the moving
party declaring whether the subject of the deportation order is also the subject
of any pending criminal proceeding under section 242(e) of the Act, and, if so,
the current status of that proceeding. If the motion to reopen or reconsider is
for the purpose of seeking discretionary relief, there shall be included in the
motion a statement by or on behalf of the moving party declaring whether the·
alien for whose relief the motion is filed is subject to any pending criminal
prosecution and, if so, the nature and current status of that prosecution. Mo- .
tions to reopen or reconsider shall state whether the validity of the deporta
tion order has been or is the subject of any judicial proceeding and, if so, the
nature and date thereof, the court in which such proceeding took place or is
pending, and its result or status. The filing of a motion to reopen or a motion
to reconsider shall not serve to stay the execution of any decision made in the
case. Execution of such decision shall proceed unless a stay of execution is
specifically granted by the Board or the officer of the Service having adminis
trative jurisdiction over the case.
Id. (emphasis added).
32. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.2, 3.8, supra note 31.
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alien's departure from the United States. 33 The granting of a mo
tion to reopen is discretionary.34
Motions to reopen deportation proceedings are not appeals to
the BIA; instead, they are described as "collateral attacks" on the
Board's order. 35 The United States Supreme Court disfavors mo
tions to reopen deportation proceedings,36 because liberal granting
of such motions permits" 'endless delay of deportation."'37 Mo
tions to reopen will not stay the execution of a pending deportation
order; rather, aliens must move separately for a stay of deport a
tion. 38 Thus, aliens may be deported prior to the disposition of
their motion to reopen.
Motions to reopen must be accompanied by a statement indi
cating whether "the validity of the unfavorable decision has been or
is the subject of any judicial proceeding[s]."39 This provision thus
contemplates concurrent agency and court jurisdiction. Concurrent
jurisdiction can only occur if the petitioner seeks review in both the
administrative and judicial forums and if a final order remains final
notwithstanding the request for agency rehearing. Thus, a second
mechanism by which a deportable alien can challenge a final order
of deportation is the statute authorizing judicial review.
2. Section 106 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
Congress added section 106 to the Immigration and Nationality
33. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2, supra note 31.
34. INS v. Doherty, 112 S. O. 719, 724 (1992).
35. White v. INS, 6 F.3d 1312, 1315 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2162
(1994) (citing 8 C.F.R. §§ 3.2, 3.8). A collateral attack is a post-judgment challenge
other than a direct appeal, such as a criminal defendant's motion to vacate sentence.
See, e.g., United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 165 (1982). A collateral challenge is not
a substitute for an appeal. Id. But see Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir.
1993) (stating that the possibility of reopening or reconsideration has the same effect as
the availability of appellate review-namely, that "what looks like a final status can
well turn out not to be a final status").
36. See INS v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 107 (1988). Motions to reopen are disfavored
for the same reasons as are petitions for rehearing and motions for new trials based on
newly discovered evidence. "There is a strong public interest in bringing litigation to a
close as promptly as is consistent with the interest in giving the adversaries a fair oppor
tunity to develop and present their respective cases." Id.
37. Id. at 108 (quoting INS v. Jong Ha Wang, 450 U.S. 139, 144 n.5 (1981».
38. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.8(a) (1994) ("Execution of such decision shall proceed unless
a stay of execution is specifically granted ...."); see also 8 C.F.R. § 3.6 (1994). Appeals
taken from deportation hearings, except appeals taken from motions to reopen, will
automatically stay execution of the deportation order while the appeal is pending.
Otherwise, the BIA has discretion to stay deportation. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.6(b).
39. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(l)(iii)(D) (1994) (emphasis added).
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Act40 to create "a single, separate, statutory form of judicial review
of administrative orders for the deportation and exclusion of aliens
from the United States."41 The procedures adopted in section 106
were based on those in the Hobbs Act,42 which established the
framework for judicial review of final orders of certain administra
tive agencies. 43 Aliens ordered deported may file' a petition for ju
dicial review in the appropriate United States court of appeals. 44
Congress sought to limit the judicial process available to such ag
grieved aliens:
The Committee on the Judiciary has been disturbed in re
cent years to observe the growing frequency of judicial actions
being instituted by undesirable aliens whose cases have no legal
basis or merit, but which are brought solely for the purpose of
preventing or delaying indefinitely their deportation from this
country.... [I]t is undoubtedly now the fact that such tactics can
prevent enforcement of the deportation provisions of the Immi
gration and Nationality Act by repetitive appeals to the busy and
overworked courts with frivolous claims of impropriety in the de
40. Pub. L. No. 87-301; 75 Stat. 650,651 (1961) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1105a (1988
& Supp. V 1993». See infra note 44.
41. H.R. REp. No. 565, ~th Cong., ~st Sess. 1 (1961); H.R. REp. No. 1086, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2966.
42. 28 U.S.c. §§ 2341-2351 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The Hobbs Administrative
Orders Review Act does not define finality, nor does it address the effect of a pending
motion to reopen or to reconsider. The United States courts of appeals are split over
the effect of these motions on the finality of a BIA'deportation order. In Interstate
Commerce Commission v. Brotherhood' of Locomotive Engineers, 482 U.S. 270 (1987),
the Court considered the effect of a motion for reconsideration for purposes of trigger
ing the running of the Hobbs Act period in which to seek judicial review of an ICC
order. Loc~motive Engineers is discussed supra, notes 21-26 and accompanying text.
43. The appeals courts have exclusive jurisdiction to review final action of the
ICC and <:ertain other agencies. 28 U.S.C. § 2342 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
.
44. See H.R. REp. No. 565, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1961); H.R. REp. No. 1086,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2966 ("the bill imple
ments and applies section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act"). See 5 U,S.C.
§§ 701-706 (1988). INA § 100(a) provides:
The procedure prescribed by, and all the provisions of chapter 158 of title
28 [the Hobbs Act, cited supra, note 42], shall apply to, and shall be the sole
and exclusive procedure for, the judicial review of all final orders of deporta
tion, heretofore or hereafter made against aliens within the United States pur
suant to administrative proceedings under section 1252(b) . . . .
8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). INA § 242(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993), establishes the procedure governing deportation hearings. Note that "a
petition for review may be filed not 'later than 90 days after the date of the issuance of
the final deportation order, or, in the case of an alien convicted of an aggravated felony,
not later than 30 days after the issuance of such order." 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(I) (1988 &
Supp. V 1993).
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portation proceedings. 45
Congress limited the judicial process by specifying the time limit in
which to seek appellate relief. Aliens have ninety days (formerly
six months) from the issuance of the final deportation order in
which to file a petition for judicial review. 46 After the BIA issues a
final order of deportation, the alien must be deported within six
months. 47 If the Board's order is judicially reviewed, the deporta
tion period runs from the date of the court's final order. A petition
for judicial review provides the alien with an automatic stay of de
portation pending the outcome of the appea1. 48
In 1990, Congress amended INA section 106(a) to require con
solidation of the judicial appeal of a deportation order with the ap
peal of a denial of reopening. 49 Courts disagree on the meaning of
this statutory provision. 50 The requirements of section 106(a), how
~ver, are only one part of the debate over finality and the effect of a
pending motion to reopen. The administrative regulations must
also be considered. Not only do the regulations specify what consti
tutes a final order, but they also promote congressional policy by
stating unambiguously that motions to reopen will not stay
deportation.

45. H.R. REP. No. 565, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1961); H.R. REP. No. 1086, 87th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950, 2967. The Committee
noted that "[certain] aliens, mostly subversives, gangsters, immoral [sic], or narcotic
peddlers, manage to protract their stay here indefinitely only because their ill-gotten
gains permit them to procure the services of astute attorneys who know how to skillfully
exploit the judicial process." H.R. REp. No. 565 at 2; 1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2967.
46. 8 U.S.c. § 1105a(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See supra note 44 for the text
of this provision.
47. The INA provides:
When a final order of deportation under administrative processes is made
against any alien, the Attorney General shall have a period of six months (rom
the date of such order, or, if judicial review is had, then from the date of the
final order of the court, within which to effect the alien's departure from the
United States ....
8 U.S.c. § 1252(c) (1988).
48. 8 U.S.c. § 1105a(a)(3) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
49. Pub. L. No. 101-649, 104 Stat. 4978, 5065 (1990) (codified at 8 U.S.c.
§ 1105a(a)(6) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) ("[W]henever a petitioner seeks review of an
order under this section, any review sought with respect to a motion to reopen or recon
sider such an order shall be consolidated with the review of the order"). A denial of a
motion to reopen is a reviewable order. See infra note 64 and accompanying text.
50. See infra note 94 and accompanying text for three conflicting opinions with
respect to INA § 106(a)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(6) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
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Finality as Expressed in the Immigration Regulations

In the immigration context, the statutory requirements of "fi
nal" orders and exhaustion of administrative remedies51 disallow
review of interlocutory orders prior to the entry of the final order. 52
Section l06(a) of the INA provides for "the sole and exclusive pro
cedure for ... judicial review of all final orders of deportation."53
Under the regulations, an immigration judge's deportation order
becomes a "final order of deportation" when the BIA dismisses an
appeal, an appeal is waived, or the time for appeal expires. 54 In
addition, any decision of the BIA is administratively final 55 and,
51. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1988) (allowing for judicial review of deportation
orders only after the petitioner has exhausted the administrative remedies available as
of right). Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a threshold obstacle to judicial re
view. Courts decline jurisdiction and require exhaustion where judicial review would
be significantly enhanced by further administrative decisionmaking. DAVIS & PIERCE,
supra note 16, § 15.2, at 310 (citing James v. HHS, 824 F.2d 1132, 1138 (D.C. Cir.
1987». Additional agency action can result in a record better suited to judicial review,
because agency decisions often require specialized expertise and may involve discre
tionary or policy determinations. Id. See infra note 100 for cases holding that a motion
to reopen is not required to exhaust administrative remedies.
Finality and exhaustion, while closely related, are analytically discrete doctrines.
The finality requirement refers to whether the agency has completed its administrative
activity and reached a "definitive position on the issue that inflicts an actual, concrete
injury;" the exhaustion requirement is concerned with the "administrative and judicial
procedures by which an injured party may seek review of an adverse decision and ob
tain a remedy." Darby v. Cisneros, 113 S. Ct. 2539, 2543 (1993) (quoting Williamson
County Regional Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172, 193 (1985». The
exhaustion of remedies doctrine is designed to prevent unnecessary or premature judi
cial interference in the processes of administrative agencies. See generally DAVIS &
PIERCE, supra note 16, § 15.2, at 308-09 (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185,
193-95 (1969». Courts balance a variety of factors in determining whether to require
exhaustion of administrative remedies. Id. These factors include: the desire to incor
porate the agency's expertise in solving the problem; the need for further factual devel
opment; the preference to allow the agency to correct its own errors; the likelihood that
the agency will resolve the issue without appellate review; avoidance of needless inter
ruption of the administrative process; and preservation of judicial resources by re
fraining from piecemeal litigation or interlocutory review. Id.
52. The BIA enters the final order of deportation. GORDON & MAILMAN, supra
note 3, at 81-85.
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1l05a(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
54. Section 243.1 of the immigration regulations provides in part that
an order of deportation ... shall become final upon dismissal of an appeal by
the Board of Immigration Appeals, upon waiver of appeal, or upon expiration
of the time allotted for an appeal when no appeal is taken; or, if such an order
is issued by the Board or approved by the Board upon certification, it shall be
final as of the date of the Board's decision.
8 C.F.R. § 243.1 (1994).
55. Id. The regulations also state that "[t]he decision of the Board shall be final
except in those cases reviewed by the Attorney General. . .. The Board may return a
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therefore, judicially appealable. Generally, when a final deporta
tion order is entered following an administrative appeal, an alien's
deportation is not affected by a motion to reconsider where depor
tation is not stayed. 56 Deportable aliens may be deported despite a
motion to reopen that is pending before the Board. 57 Because ac
tual deportation is tantamount to a dismissal of the motion to reo
pen,58 an order to surrender for immediate deportation is "final"
and may be judicially reviewed. 59
Thus, while the. regulations state that motions to reopen will
not stay deportation, they do not explicitly answer whether a pend
ing motion at the administrative level suspends the finality of a "fi
nal order of deportation" so as to prevent appellate jurisdiction. 60
This question has divided the United States courts of appeals.
II.

THE DIVISION AMONG THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF

ApPEALS

The courts of appeals that have considered whether an
unadjudicated motion to reopen has any effect on jurisdiction can
be divided into three basic groups. Section II is thus divided into
three subsections: first,· courts that hold that a pending motion to
reopen renders a deportation order nonfinal; second, courts that
hold that motions to reopen filed in good faith suspend the finality
of the order; and third, courts that hold that motions to reopen have
no effect on the finality or appealability of a deportation order.
A.

Suspended Finality: The United States Courts of Appeals for
the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits

The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit holds that a motion
to reopen filed prior to a petition for judicial review renders the
BIA's deportation decision nonfinal and thus nonappealable. 61 If a
case to the Service or Immigration Judge for such further action as may be appropriate,
without entering a final decision on the merits of the case." 8 C.F.R. § 3.l(d)(2) (1994).
56. GORDON & MAILMAN, supra note 3, at 81-31 (citing Say v. Del Guercio, 237
F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1956». See also Roque-Carranza v. INS, 778 F.2d 1373 (9th Cir.
1985), in which the court granted a stay of deportation to allow time for a motion to
reopen to be filed with and adjudicated by the BIA. Id. at 1374. See infra note 120.
57. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.8(a) (1994), supra note 31.
58. 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1994).
59. Say v. Del Guercio, 237 F.2d 715, 717 (9th Cir. 1956).
60. But see 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1988), supra note 24, the literal language which per
mits simultaneous jurisdiction.
61. See, e.g., Ogio v. INS, 2 F.3d 959, 961 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam); Ber
roteran-Melendez v. INS, 955 F.2d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 1992); Chu v. INS, 875 F.2d 777,
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motion to reopen is filed with the Board in a timely manner, "an
otherwise appealable final order becomes no longer appealable in
this court until the motion is denied or the proceedings have been
effectively terminated."62 The Ninth Circuit does not exercise juris
diction over the BIA's order of deportation until a motion to reo
pen is denied.63
A denial of a motion to reopen is a new ord~r independently
reviewable by the courts of appeals under section l105a(a).64 If
timely appeal is taken fro~ the BIA's denial of reopening, the
Ninth Circuit has jurisdiction to review both the order of deporta
tion and the denial of the motion to reopen. The Ninth Circuit
thereby provides. a single appellate proceeding in which aliens re
tain the right to appeal the underlying order, even if the statutory
time period in which to seek judicial review has expired. 65
Generally, aliens file motions to reopen with the BIA prior to
seeking judicial review. In such a case, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit justifies the practice of suspending finality as one that
"avoids duplication and waste of judicial and agency resources, and
promotes the judicial policy of allowing administrative agencies the
opportunity to correct their own mistakes."66 In the Ninth Circuit,
however, a motion to reopen made after a petition for judicial re
view will not affect the finality of a deportation order. 67 For exam

a

779-80 (9th Cir. 1989); Fayazi-Azad v. INS, 792 F.2d 873, 874 (9th Cir. 1986); Roque
Carranza v. INS, 778 F.2d 1373, 1374 (9th Cir. 1985); Hyun Joon Chung v. INS, 720 F.2d
1471,1474 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1216 (1984); Bregman v. INS, 351 F.2d
401, 402-03 (9th Cir. 1965).
62. Hyun Joan Chung, 720 F.2d at 1474. This is a timeliness case; see supra note
21. The Hyun Joan Chung court held that the judicial review period for a deportation
order was tolled while the motion to reopen remained pending before the BIA. The
order was nonfinal because the administrative proceedings were "not effectively termi
nated." 720 F.2d at 1474.
63. Id.
64. 8 U.S.c.§ 1105a(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See Giova v. Rosenberg, 379 U.S.
18 (1964) (per curiam).
65. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted the legislative history of
INA § 106, and the congressional intent "to create a process in which there is a single
judicial review of all questions relating to an alien's deportation." Hyun Joan Chung,
720 F.2d at 1474. The motion to reopen tolls the period in which to seek judicial review
of the deportation order. The period begins to run upon disposition of the motion. [d.
66. Berroteran-Melendez v. INS, 955 F.2d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 1992). In the
Ninth Circuit, if the BIA denies the motion to reopen, both the denial of that motion
and the original deportation order may be reviewed if the appeal is sought within the
proper time. Id. (citing Hyun Joan Chung, 720 F.2d at 1474).
67. "[T]he filing of a motion to reopen renders nonfinal only an order as to which
a petition for review has not been filed." Ogio v. INS, 2 F.3d 959, 961 (9th Cir. 1993)

1995]

REJECTING THE "SUSPENDED FINALITY" APPROACH

123

pIe, in Berroteran-Melendez v. INS,68 the motion to reopen was
subinitted to the BIA after the petition for review was made to the
court of appeals. Despite the unadjudicated motion, the Ber
roteran-Melendez court held that it had jurisdiction.69 However, for
the court to adhere to its goal of judicial efficiency, the court would
have had to hold the case in abeyance until disposition of the mo
tion to reopen. 70 Such suspension of the judicial process would cre
ate an automatic stay of deportation until the motion was decided,
contrary to the regulations. 71 In such a case, aliens could abuse the
system and delay deportation by filing administrative motions after
seeking judicial review.· Thus, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit holds that in cases where aliens first file for judiGial review
and then seek reopening at the administr~tive level, outstanding
motions to reopen will not suspend finality and the court of appeals
has jurisdiction over the case.72
The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit follows the
Ninth Circuit view that a motion to reopen pending before the BIA
defeats the finality of an otherwise final deportation order.73 Judi
cial review is precluded until the BIA's disposition of the motion to
reopen.
B.

The "Good Faith" Approach: The United States Courts of
Appeals for the Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia
Circuits

The Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and District of Columbia
Circuits, recognizing the potential for abuse of the deportation pro
cess, adopted a modified version of the Ninth Circuit's rule: only
motions to reopen filed in good faith render a deportation order
nonfinal.74 In Attoh v. INS,75 the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit examined the Ninth Circuit's decision in
(per curiam) (distinguishing Akrap v. INS, 966 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1992». See infra note
94 and accompanying text for a discussion of Akrap.
68. 955 F.2d 1251, 1254 (9th Cir. 1992).
69. Id.
70. Id. at 1255 (citing Chu v. INS, 875 F.2d 777, 779 (9th Cir. 1989».
71. Motions to reopen will not stay deportation. 8 C.F.R. § 3.8(a) (1994). See
supra note 38 and accompanying text.
72. Berroteran-Melendez, 955 F.2d at 1255.
73. See Fleary v. INS, 950 F.2d 711, 713 (11th Cir. 1992).
74. Pierre v. INS, 932 F.2d 418, 420-21 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam); Attoh v. INS,
606 F.2d 1273, 1275-76 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
75. 606 F.2d at 1275-76 n.15.
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Bregman v. INS.76 The Attoh court conduded that the Ninth Cir
cuit's approach could be "troubling" in a case involving multiple
and frivolous motions for reopening or reconsideration, because
aliens conceivably could file successive motions to reopen the deni
als of previous motions to reopen, thereby postponing deporta
tion. 77 Thus, the Attoh court adopted Bregman "only insofar as it
implicitly recognizes that intervening good faith petitions for ad
ministrative relief may toll or suspend the running of the time limit"
in which to seek judicial review. 78
Similarly, in Fu Chen Hsiung v. INS,19 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's Bregman rule,
but, nevertheless, refused to review the underlying deportation or
der because of the apparent "dilatory tactics."so In Pierre v. INS,8!
the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit followed the Attoh
court. 82 Note, however, that these cases dealt with problems of the
statute of limitations. Judicial review of the original deportation or
der was precluded unless the filing of the motion to reopen sus
pended the order's finality and tolled the period in which to
appea1. 83
C.

Courts Rejecting Suspended Finality: The United States
Courts of Appeals for the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
and Tenth Circuits

In Alleyne v. INS,84 the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
rejected the Ninth Circuit's rule of suspended finality and held that
a motion to reopen did not defeat the finality of the BIA's order.
Accordingly, the court allowed "simultaneous review" in both the
judicial and administrative forums.85 The Alleyne court relied on its
earlier ruling in Nocon v. INS,86 which sought to prevent "undue
76. 351 F.2d 401 (9th Cir. 1965).
77. Attoh, 606 F.2d at 1276 n.15.
78. Id.
79. 607 F.2d 996 (2d Cir. 1979) (unpublished text in LEXIS Genfed library,
Courts file).
80. This case involved "multiple actions for review." Id.
81. 932 F.2d 418 (5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam).
82. Id. at 420-21.
83. See supra note 21 for further discussion of the timeliness matter.
84. 879 F.2d 1177, 1181 (3d Cir. 1989) (motion to reopen filed after petition for
review).
85. Id. at 1181 n.7; compare Alleyne with Mortazavi v. INS, 719 F.2d 86, 87 (4th
Cir. 1983) (motion to reopen filed after the review petition; alien asked that petition be
held in abeyance while awaiting the disposition on the motion).
86. 789 F.2d 1028 (3d Cir. 1986). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held

1995]

REJECTING THE "SUSPENDED FINALITY" APPROACH

125

delay" in deportation once the alien's status had been deter
mined. 87 The court reviewed the relevant legislative history, which
showed that when the legislature enacted the INA
Congress was especially sensitive to what it designated as "the
growing frequency of judicial actions being instituted by undesir
able aliens whose cases ... are brought solely for the purpose of
preventing or delaying indefinitely their deportation from this
country." ... Protracted litigation was viewed by Congress as a
means of exploiting the judicial process. Thus, permitting aliens
the benefit of additional time from their filing of motions to reo
pen or to reconsider would directly contravene [c)ongressional
intent to prevent successive, piecemeal appeals from being used
as a dilatory tactic to postpone the execution of deportation
orders. 88

Consequently, the Alleyne court held that the rule of Locomotive
Engineers 89 did not apply in the immigration context, thereby giv
ing effect to the legislative policy judgment that judicial efficiency
was secondary to curbing the "potential for abusive appeals."90. The
court also noted that the regulations pertaining to motions to reo
pen do not allow aliens to delay deportation pending a decision by
the BIA.91 Thus, motions to reopen do not destroy the finality of a
that filing a motion for reconsideration did not toll the period for seeking judicial re
view under the INA. Concluding that the immigration context differed from that of
other administrative agencies, the court held that separate review petitions must be
filed within six months of the specific order for which review is sought. [d. at 1033. See
note 21 supra for a discussion of the timeliness issue.
Other courts have held that a separate petition for review need not be filed for
jurisdiction to review the underlying order. See, e.g., Pierre v. INS, 932 F.2d 418, 420
(5th Cir. 1991) (per curiam) Gurisdiction to review Board's denial of petition for rehear
ing because that was a final order within the meaning of § 1105a; court also concluded it
had jurisdiction to review "underlying final deportation order," following Attoh v. INS,
606 F.2d 1273, 1276 n.15 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam) ("[G]ood faith petitions for
administrative relief may toll or suspend the running of the time limit."».
87. Nocon, 789 F.2d at 1033.
88. [d. (quoting H.R. REp. No. 1086, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in
1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2950,2967) (citation omitted).
89. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for the rule of Locomotive
Engineers.
90. Alleyne v. INS, 879 F.2d 1177, 1181 (3d Cir. 1989).
91. [d. at 1181-82 n.7 (citations omitted). The court also rejected Alleyne's sug
gestion that it "defer decision until the Board has acted while retaining jurisdiction over
the petition and the stay of deportation." [d. at 1182 n.8. This idea would conflict with
the immigration regulations to the extent that it gave petitioner "a longer stay than
otherwise available," as well as have a dubious effect in promoting judicial efficiency.
[d. But see Gebremichael v. INS, 10 F.3d 28, 33 n.13 (1st Cir. 1993) (court deferred its
decision until BIA's disposition of motions to reopen and reconsider; this was held to
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deportation order in the. Third Circuit.
The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit followed the
Third Circuit and held that the BIA's deportation. order is final
when issued and remains final despite a motion to reopen.92 In
Akrap v. INS, the Seventh Circuit considered INA section 106(a),
which provides that "whenever a petitioner. seeks revjew of an or
der under this s~ction, any review sought with respect to. a motion
to reopen or reconsider such an order shall be consolidated with the
review of the order."93 This language refers to judiCial review of
both the underlying deportation order and the ~IA's c;lenial of re
opening or reconsideration. The court held that a deportation or
der remains final regardless of a pending motion to reopen. 94 The
language of section l06(a) also persuaded the Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit, in Bauge v. INS,95 that' an unadjudicated motion
be a "prudent alternative" to deciding whether unadjudicated administrative motions
.
had any effect on finality of deportation orders).
92. Akrap v. INS, 966 F.2d 267, 271 (7th Cir. 1992) (court had jurisdiction to
review order after timely petition for review). The Seventh Circuit's rule that finality
attaches upon issuance of the BIA opinion is consistent with the immigration regula
tions. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 243.1 (1994) and 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2) (1994), supra notes 54
and 55.
93. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(6) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
94. Akrap, 966 F.2d at 270-71. In Fleary v. INS, 950 F.2d 711 (11th Cir. 1992), the
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion when it
decided that this provision supported the view of suspended finality. Id. at 713. The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected "the procedural pitfall suggested by
Fleary," that amotion to reopen destroys the finality of the original order, making it
nonreviewable. Akrap, 966 F.2d at 271. Fleary referred to consolidation of two BIA
"orders," but the statute refers to consolidation of "reviews;" the Akrap court re
sponded that "[i]f the filing of a motion to reopen were to render any previous orders
non-final, only one final order would exist-and what then would be subject to 'consoli
dation' even in the Fleary view?" Id. In Stone v. INS, 13 F.3d 934 (6th Cir.), cert..
granted, 114 S. Ct. 2098 (1994), the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit stated that
"[t]he logic of the Seventh Circuit's Akrap decision strikes us as irrefutable." Id. at 938.
The Stone court held that a final order of deportation remains final despite the filing of
a motion to reconsider within the period for seeking judicial review. Id. at 938-39.
However, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit rejected as irrelevant any
inquiry based on the language of § 1105a(a)(6). White v. INS, 6 F.3d 1312, 1317 (8th
Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2162 (1994). The White court decided that this provi
sion "means only that if both reviews are pending at the same time they should be
heard together. We do not think Congress intended by this simple provision to inter
fere with the goal of expediting deportation once the alien's status has been deter
mined." Id.
95. 7 F.3d 1540 (10th Cir. 1993). The Bauge court decided that this consolidation
provision suggests that multiple reviewable orders can exist at the same time, an impos
sibility if a motion to reopen makes an order nonfinal and nonreviewable. Id. at 1542;
For example, consider the situation involving an original deportation order and a
subsequent denial of reopening, which is also reviewable. If an alien requests the BIA
to reconsider its denial of reopening, that order is unreviewable so long as the request
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to reopen does not preclude judicial review.
In Rhoa-Zamora v. INS,96 the Court of Appeals for the Sev
enth Circuit agai~ ruled that a pending motion to reopen did not
rendeor the BIA's order nonfinal for appeal purposes. 97 In Rhoa
Zamora, the alien filed a motion to reopen98 with the BIA, which
was unadjudicated when the alien petitioned for judicial review. 99
The Rhoa-Zamora court noted that its jurisdiction could not attach
if the filing of a motion to reopen rendered the BIA de~ision nonfi
nal and nonreviewable.lOo The Court of Appeals for the Seventh
for reconsideration is pending. In this situation. only the original deportation order
could be judicially reviewed. Note that this scenario apparently requires simultaneous
agencY and court jurisdiction. But see Ogio v. INS. 2 F.3d 959. 960-61 (9th Cir. 1993)
(per curiam) (holding that § 1105a(a)(6) is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's sus
pended finality rule).
.
The Bauge court found that if a motion rendered the deportation order nonfinal.
"significant delay" of deportation would be "simply unavoidable" because aliens could
file the motions "regardless of merit." and thereby defer deportation until the BIA's
disposition of the motion. Bauge. 7 F.3d at 1542. This possibility is contrary to the
history of section 106(a) and immigration law's unique goal of facilitating deportation.
Thus. despite the ordinary rule in administrative law that orders under reconsideration
are nonfinal. immigration cases demand different finality rules. Id.
96. 971 F.2d 26 (7th Cir. 1992). cert. denied. 113 S. Ct. 1943 (1993) and cert. de
nied. 113 S. Ct. 2331 (1993).
97. Id. at 33.
98. Id. at 29 & n.1. The court noted that Zamora had filed a "motion to recon
sider." Motions to reopen and motions to reconsider are different motions with distinct
requirements. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.8(a) (1994).osupra note 31. Because Zamora's motion
was "more accurately characterized as a motion to reopen than as a motion to recon
sider." the court treated it as a motion to reopen. Rhoa-Zamora. 971 F.2d at 29-30 n.1.
99. ./d. at 30.
100. The first jurisdiction question considered by the court was whether the BIA
must dispose of the pending motion to reopen before the alien could be said to have
"'exhausted the administrative remedies available to him as of right. ..• Id. at 31 (quot
ing 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1988». The INS argued that the pending motion to reopen
deprived the court of jurisdiction. citing Dokic v. INS. 899 F.2d 530. 532 (6th Cir. 1990)
(judicial review of a deportation order is unavailable until asylum applicant has ex
hausted his administrative remedies "by filing a motion to reopen"). Rhoa-Zamora.
971 F.2d at 31. Reasoning that such a rule would require that the motion be denied by
the Board before petitioners could file for judicial review. the court rejected the Sixth
Circuit'srule of exhaustion. because "reopening is a discretionary remedy. not one
available as of right." Id. Also. without any new evidence to support reopening.
mandatory filing of such motions "would be a waste of time and administrative re
sources" as well as "contrary to the strong policy interest in preventing the use of frivo
lous motions to reconsider or reopen in order to postpone the execution of deportation
orders." Id. at 31-32 (citing Pierre v. INS. 932 F.2d 418. 421 (5th Cir. 1991); Marilyn
Mann. Note. Tl1TIeliness of Petitions for Judicial Review Under Section 106(a) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act. 86 MICH. L. REv. 990. 1012-13 (1988». Conse
quently. aliens need not file a motion to reopen to satisfy the requirement of exhaustion
of administrative remedies. Id.; see also Castillo-Villagra v. INS. 972 F.2d 1017. 1023-24
(9th Cir. 1992) (filing of motion to reopen is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to judicial
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Circuit concluded that the rule of Locomotive Engineers 101 did not
apply in the immigration context, where the "efficient use of judi
cial resources is secondary to a different goal: preventing the use of
'dilatory tactic[s] to postpone the execution of deportation or
ders."'102 The Rhoa-Zamora court reasoned that if the motion to
reopen suspended finality of the BIA's order, the motion could de
lay deportation so long as it remained unadjudicated.l~3 Thus, Lo
comotive Engineers is fundamentally incompatible with the
principal immigration policy goal, of expediting the deportation
process.
The Rhoa-Zamora court also disagreed with the Ninth Cir
cuit's interpretation that would allow an alien to obtain an auto
matic stay of deportation by petitioning for review of both the
BIA's order of deportation and the subsequent denial of the mo
tion to reopen. Not only would such a result contravene the regula
tions,l04 but it also would be "clearly contrary" to the congressional
intent underlying the enactment of the INA. lOS
In White v. INS,106 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
agreed with the Seventh Circuit that Congress intended to facilitate
the deportation of deportable aliens. The court held that the pen
dency of a motion to reopen or to reconsider before the BIA "has
no ef~ect on the finality, or the ripeness 107 for judicial review, of a
review); Athehortua-Vanegas v. INS, 876 F.2d 238, 240 (1st Cir.1989) (petitioner's un
successful appeal to BIA exhausted administrative remedies available as of right).
101. See supra notes 21 and 26 for a discussion of Locomotive Engineers.
102. Rhoa-Zamora, 971 F.2d at 33 (quoting Alleyne v. INS, 879 F.2d 1177, 1180
(3d Cir. 1989) and citing Berroteran-Melendez v. INS, 955 F.2d 1251, 1255 (9th Cir.
1992». In Leal-Rodriguez v. INS, 990 F.2d 939 (7th Cir. 1993), the court cited both
Rhoa-Zamora, 971 F.2d at 32-33 (motion to reopen filed before petition for judicial
review) and Berroteran-Melendez, 955 F.2d at i255 (motion to reopen filed after peti
tion for review) for the proposition that a pending motion to reopen did not deprive the
court of jurisdiction. Id. at 948 n.11.
103. Rhoa-Zamora, 971 F.2d at 33.
104. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.8(a) (1994), supra note 31. The court also noted that the
regulations contemplate the pendency of motions to reopen while the BIA's decision is
appealed. Rhoa-Zamora, 971 F.2d at 33 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 103.5a (1994» ("Motions to
reopen or reconsider shall state whether the validity of the order has been or is the
subject of any judicial ·proceeding.").
105. Rhoa-Zamora, 971 F.2d at 33 n.6. But see Castaneda-Suarez v. INS, 993
F.2d 142, 145-46 (7th Cir. 1993) (deportation order stayed until BIA addressed pending
motion to reopen).
106. 6 F.3d 1312 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2162 (1994).
107. "Ripeness" refers to the fitness of issues for a judicial decision, and the hard
ship that would result to the parties if the court were to withhold a decision on the
merits. See Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 148-49 (1967). Issues are fit for
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final order of deportation. "108 To hold otherwise would increase
the allowable time for seeking judicial review to ninety days after
the BIA's denial of reopening. 109 Suspended finality would also
deny the courts jurisdiction until reopening was denied. llo
To distinguish Locomotive Engineers, the White court looked
to the INA and the immigration regulations, which support the fi
nality of a BIA deportation order regardless of a pending motion to
reopen or reconsider. 111 Indeed, there is no indication in the INA
or the relevant regulations that these discretionary motions affect
the finality of a deportation order, no matter when the motions are
filed or ruled upon. 112 The White court described motions to reo
pen or to reconsider. as analogous to motions for relief from judg
ment for mistake or for newly discovered evidence. 113 These
analogous motions do not suspend the firiality of judgments.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit further distin
guished Locomotive Engineers because the INA is more generous
than the Hobbs Act in providing for both administrative and judi
cial review. 114 In addition, the suspended finality interpretation
would foster abuse of the deportation process by allowing aliens to
file motions to reopen or to reconsider "ad infinitum."115 Curbing
judicial review, for example, when they involve purely legal questions or when the
agency action directly and immediately impacts the party seeking relief. [d. at 149, 152.
108. White, 6 F.3d at 1317. The court noted that its decision did not affect the
Eighth Circuit's discretionary option to accept jurisdiction over the petition for review
and hold it in abeyance pending the BIA's ruling on the motion. [d. at n.5.
109. "[A] petition for review may be filed not later than 90 days after the date of
the issuance of the final deportation order ...." 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(I) (1988 & Supp.
V 1993).
110. White, 6 F.3d at 1314.
111. [d. at 1314-15.
112. The court cited 8 C.F.R. § 243.1 (1993) (specifying when an order of depor
tation becomes final) and 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2) (1993) (exceptions to rule that Board
decisions are final). White, 6 F.3d at 1315. These regulations appear supra at notes 54
and 55.
113. White, 6 F.3d at 1315 (citing FED. R. ClY.P. 6O(b) and FED. R. CRlM. P. 33).
114. [d. at 1315-16. The Hobbs Act provides for 60 days to petition for review, 28
U.S.C. § 2344 (1988), whereas the INA allows 90 days to seek judicial review of final
deportation orders. 8 U.S.c. § 1105a(a)(I) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). Also, the Interstate
Commerce Act construed in Locomotive Engineers allowed aggrieved parties just
twenty days to seek reopening or reconsideration. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 U.S. 270, 279 n.2 (1987). But aliens may bring
these motions any time prior to their departure. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1994), supra note
31.
115. White, 6 F.3d at 1316. The court explained that motions to reopen may be
filed after any adverse BIA decision. If a deportation order lacks finality until the de
nial of any motion to reopen, an alien attempting to delay deportation conceivably
"could wait until just before the ninety-day Uudicial] appeal period expired and then
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the potential for such abuse takes precedence over promoting judi
cial economy.116
According to the White court, the mandatory provision for an
automatic stay of deportation with a petition for judicial review117
"is corrupted by the scenario of suspended finality."118 The filing of
a motion to reopen or reconsider does not stay deportation.u 9 This
fact of deportability suggests that motions to reopen do riot defeat
the finality of a deportation order. The White court observed that
the Ninth Circuit nevertheless maintains that a pending administra
tive motion renders the order "nonfinal."120 If nonfinal for pur
poses of deportation, the deportation order could not be
executed;121 if nonfinal only for appeal, an alien could be deported,
but the court could not exercise appellate jurisdiction. Aliens de
file a motion to reopen or reconsider." Id. The denial of the motion may be judicially
reviewed, and if the alien had not been deported by the time of the ruling on the mo
tion, he or she could not only appeal the denial but also file a new motion to reopen the
BIA's denial of the first motion. Id.
.
116. Id. (citing Alleyne v. INS, 879 F.2d 1177, 1181 (3d Cir. 1989».
117. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3) (1988 and Supp. V 1993).
118. White, 6 F.3d at 1317.
119. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.8(a) (1994), supra note 31. See also 8 C.F.R.
§ 103.5(a)(1)(iv) (1994) ("Unless the Service directs otherwise, the filing of amotion to
reopen or reconsider ... does not stay the execution of any decision in a case or extend
a previously set departure date.").
.
120. White, 6 F.3d at i317. The Ninth Circuit distinguishes between finality for
appeal and finality for purposes of deportation. A problem with this view is that an
alien (if unable to get a stay) .can be deported while awaiting disposition of the motion
to reopen. For example, in Roque-Carranza v. INS, the court held that an alien was
required to comply with the INS regulations and file a motion to reopen with BIA, in
order to avoid premature interference with the administrative processes. 778 F.2d 1373,
1374 (9th Cir. 1985). The court stated that this procedure would give parties the "bene
fit of the agency's expertise" and result in a record suitable for appellate review. [d.
The court therefore granted a stay of deportation to allow time for the motion to be
filed and adjudicated. Id~
However, aliens are not required to file motions to reopen. Even if they were
required, there is no basis in the INA or the regulations for the granting of a stay in this
situation. The Ninth Circuit has acknowledged the lack of any "justification for the
courts to create any new rights to a stay as a matter of federal common law." Larimi v.
INS, 782 F.2d 1494, 1497 (9th Cir. 1986) (notihg that statute permits stay of deportation
only while petition for review is peqding; court had no authority to grant "indefinite
stay;" Roque-Carranza distinguished as involving a limited stay "to allow an alien time
to apply for relief to which he might be entitled"). The Ninth Circuit's distinction be·
tween finality for appeal and finality for deportation is inherently inconsistent as well as
incompatible with the statutory and regulatory scheme. See text accompanying notes
121-22. It makes more sense to hold that an order of deportation is final fqr judicial
review- at the same time that it is final for purposes of an alien's deportation: upon
decision of the BIA.
121. The deportation order would be void and §§ 3.8(a) and 103.5(a)(1)(iv) of the
regulations would be superfluous. See supra notes 31, 119 for these regulations.
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ported pursuant to a "nonfinal" order are thereby deprived of judi
cial review and its automatic stay of deportation. This choice
presented by the "suspended finality" rule was unacceptable to the
Eighth Circuit.122 By holding the deportation order final and ap
pealable despite the unadjudicated motion to reopen, the court re
jected the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits' view.
Furthermore, the White court declined to follow the reasoning
espoused by the Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits, asserting it
was "well beyond the scope of our role ... to determine whether an
alien has filed a motion to reopen or reconsider in 'good faith."'123
In the court's opinion, declining jurisdiction' effectively encourages
exploitation of the deportation process, contrary to congressional
intent as well as prudent judicial concerns. "'In administering this
country's immigration laws, the Attorney General and the INS con
front an onerous task even without the addition of judicially aug
mented incentives to take meritless appeals, engage in repeated
violations, and undertake other conduct solely to drag out the de
portation process. "'124 The Eighth Circuit therefore would not al
Iowan alien to delay deportation by filing motions to reopen.
Finally, in Stone v. INS,125 the Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit held that a motion to reconsider filed within the 90-day ap
peal period126 did not toll the statutory time for seeking judicial
review. 127 The court found that this conclusion waS required by the
1990 amendments to INA section 106(a),128 which added subsection
(6).129 "This provision for consolidating review of the final deporta
tion order with review of ~he Board's disposition of a motion to
reopen or reconsider would make no sense at all unless separate
122, White, 6 F.3d at 1316.
123, Id. at 1314. See supra note 74 and accompanying text for the rule in the
Fifth and District of Columbia Circuits.
1~4. Id. at 1317 (quoting INS v. Rios-Pineda, 471 U.S. 444, 450-51 (1985».
125. 13 F.3d 934 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 2098 (1994).
126. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(1) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)'.
127. Stone, 13 F.3d at 935. This case is a timeliness problem, which is related to,
but separate from, the issue of whether an order is appealable pending the disposition
of a motion for administrative relief. See supra note 21.
128. Id. at 938 (citing Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 545(b)(3), 104 Stat. 4978, 5065

(1990»..
129. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § p05a(a)(6) (1988 & Supp. V 1993). See also supra notes
and accompanying text. The Sixth Circuit followed the reasoning of the Seventh
Circuit in Akrap and the Third Circuit in Nocon. Stone, 13 F.3d at 937-38 (citing Akrap
v. 'INS, 966. F.2d.267, 271 (7th Cir. 1992); Nocon v. INS, 789 F.2d 1028, 1033 (3d Cir.
1986».
92~95
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petitions for review could be filed."130 The Stone court rejected the
Ninth Circuit's suspension of finality approach as inconsistent with
the INA.131
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held:
It is true that Congress was concerned about dilatory tactics,

but given the way in which the system works in practice the Ninth
Circuit approach seems more conducive to dilatory tactics than .
does the Third Circuit approach. Under the Ninth Circuit's [ap
proach] ... , an alien against whom a final deportation order has
been entered can file a reconsideration motion, meritorious or
not, and simply wait for however long it takes for the authorities
to commence execution of the deportation order or for the Board
to decide the motion for reconsideration. Normally, when one of
those events finally occurs, the alien can then obtain a stay of the
deportation order by filing a petition for judicial review. . . .
Given the measured pace at which the I.N.S. often operates, the
filing of a motion for reconsideration may, under the Ninth Cir
cuit approach, mean that the day of judgment in the court of ap
peals-and actual deportation-will not arrive until months or
years later than would otherwise have been the case.132

The Stone court held that upon the BIA's dismissal of the appeal,
the deportation order became final. 133 The petitioner then filed a
motion to reconsider. 134 This motion did not suspend the finality of
the deportation order, and, therefore, the petition for judicial re
view came "too late" to give the court jurisdiction to review the
underlying deportation order.135
III. ANALYSIS

Disagreement exists among the United States courts of appeals
over whether a motion to reopen suspends the finality of a deporta
tion order, preventing appellate court jurisdiction until the BIA
130. Stone, 13 F.3d at 938.
131. Id.
132. Id. The court added that "[i]t is not without significance ... that it took the
Board of Immigration Appeals more than 17 months to reject as frivolous the motion
for reconsideration filed here by petitioner Stone." Id.
133. Id. at 936 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 243.1 (1994)).
134. Id. Stone appeared pro se and filed a "Motion to Reopen and/or to Recon
sider its Decision; Appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals." Because the motion
did not set out any new facts, the Board treated it as a motion to reconsider. Id. (citing
8 C.F.R. § 3.8 (1994)).
135. Id. at 939. The court had jurisdiction to review only whether the BIA
abused its discretion in denying the motion to reconsider. Id. at 935. Note that timeli
ness and jurisdiction are technically separate issues. See supra note 21.

1995]

REJECTING THE "SUSPENDED FINALITY" APPROACH

133

rules on the motion. The courts are divided, and each position has
some merit. The subject of this analysis is how courts should an
swer the question of what effect, if any, a pending motion for re
opening or reconsideration has on the finality and appealability of
deportation orders. After examining certain strengths and weak
nesses of the various views, this Note concludes that those courts
rejecting the Ninth Circuit's suspended finality rule have a stronger
position that is more readily justified in terms of the applicable reg
ulations and legislative policy goals.
Because final agency action is a jurisdictional requirement,
courts lack jurisdiction over a case if the possibility of reopening or
reconsideration at the agency level destroys an order's finality. The
Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits hold that a
pending motion to reopen or reconsider renders an otherwise final
order of deportation nonfinal for appellate purposes. 136 However,
the Courts of Appeals for the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, and
Tenth Circuits hold that the pending motion has no effect on the
finality or appealability of a deportation order, and, therefore,
courts have jurisdiction. Comparing the relevant decisions shows
that this latter group of courts espouses a more sensible rule: a mo
tion to reopen does not affect finality.
A.

Administrative Regulations and Legislative Policy

Courts give deference to an agency's interpretation of an am
biguous statute if the interpretation "is based on a permissible con
struction of the statute."137 Section 106(a) of the INA provides for
judicial review of "final" orders of deportation, and the immigra
tion regulations specifically define the point at which deportation
orders become final. By specifying that a BIA order is final, the
regulations designate what may be appealed to the courts.138 In ad
136. There is some ambiguity as to which camp the Courts of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, Second, and Fifth Circuits belong. While these courts follow an
approach similar to that of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits, they also recognize the
inherent potential for abuse of the deportation process when allowing the filing of mo
tions to reopen to suspend or defeat an order's finality. Eliminating this potential for
abuse is the basis for the rule adopted by the Courts of Appeals for the Third, Sixth,.
Seventh, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits. See supra part II.A-C.
137. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-45 (1984). See also Coal Employment Project v. Dole, 889 F.2d 1127, 1131
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (applying Chevron).
138. The decision of the BIA is final. See supra note 54. "Except when certified
to the Board, the decision of the Immigration Judge becomes final upon waiver of ap
peal or upon expiration of the time to appeal if no appeal is taken whichever occurs
first." 8 C.F.R. § 3.39 (1994).
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dition, the regulations enumerate certain exceptions as to when a
decision is final,139 without any reference to motions to reopen or
their purported ability to suspend finality. In fact, the regulations
explicitly state that motions to reopen or reconsider will not inter
fere with the execution of a deportation order. l40 The regulations
disallow petitioners to stay deportation by filing these motions, and
thereby promote Congress' goal of eliminating unnecessary delay in
the deportation process. The relevant regulations have never been
challenged as inconsistent with the legislative will; administrative
construction of a statute should be followed unless there are '''com
pelling indications that it is wrong."141
The only way a motion to reopen can stay deportation is if the
motion suspends the finality of a deportation order. Thus, the regu
lations, which state that a motion pending before the BIA will not
interfere with deportation, do not contemplate the suspension of
finality. Assuming that the regulations are consistent with the lan
guage and purpose of the INA, the Ninth Circuit's suspended final
ity approach is inconsistent with congressional policy, at least to the
extent that the suspended finality rule is inconsistent with the immi
gration regulations.
B.

The Ninth Circuit's ApprQach to Suspension of Finality

In the Ninth Circuit, a motion to reopen that is pending when
an alien petitions for judicial review will defeat the finality of the
underlying deportation order and deprive the court of jurisdiction
until the BIA's ruling on the motion to reopen. 142 This practice is
consistent with the rule of Locomotive Engineers .143 However, if
the motion to reopen is filed after the court receives a petition for
judicial review, the deportation order remains a final order and th~
139. See 8 C:F.R. § 3.1(d)(2) (1994), supra note 55 ("The decision of the Board
shall be final except. in those cases reviewed by the Attorney General" or those re
turned to "the Service or Immigration Judge for such further action as may be
appropriate").
140. See, e.g., 8 C.F.R. § 3.8(a) (1994), supra note 31.
141. ~.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Collins, 432 U.S. 46, 54~55 (1977) (quoting
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969». See also INS v. Cardoza
Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 445 n.29 (1987) (congressiol}al intent controls in statutory inter
pretation); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984).
.
142. See supra note 61 for the pertinent citations.
143. Interstate Commerce .Comrn'n v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482
U.S. 270, 284-85 (1987). In Chu v. INS, the Ninth Circuit stated that there was "no
principled basis upon which to distinguish Chu's case from Locomotive Engineers and
its progeny." 875 F.2d 777, 780-81 (9thCir. 1989).
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court will not be divested of jurisdiction. l44 Thus, the Ninth Circuit
employs different finality rules depending on when the motion to
reopen is filed with the BIA.14s The effect of this approach is to
deny the court jurisdiction if the motion to reopen is filed before
the petition for review, yet to allow simultaneous agency and court
jurisdiction if the motion to reopen is made after the petition for
judicial review, as in Berroteran-Melendez. l46 .
Berroteran-Melendez is just one example of how the Ninth Cir
cuit's suspended finality rille encourages the use of dilatory tactics
to forestall deportation. Although the petitioners initially had
sought appellate review, they apparently filed a motion to reopen
with the BIA in order to suspend the finality of the deportation
order and preclude the court's jurisdicti~n.147 This strategy would
postpone judicial review until the BIA's disposition of the motion
and delay deportation. The whole purpose of amending INA sec
tion l06(a) was to eliminate judicial review procedures that en
couraged abuse of the deportation process.
Despite petitioners' efforts, the' Ninth Circuit held that it had
jurisdiction irrespective of the pending motion to reopen. l48 The
court supported its decision by citing Wall v. INS,149 in which the
court stayed the petition for review pending a decision on the mo
tion to reopen. 150 The practice of withholding a decision until dis
position of the motion is consistent with the Ninth Circuit view that
an order of deportation is final and appealable after a denial of the
motion to reopen. However, rather than concluding it lacked juris
diction to review, the court took jurisdiction while suspending the
judicial process at the same time. The Berroteran-Melendez court
acknowledged that "[o]ther circuits have similarly exercised juris
diction despite a pending motion to reopen. "151
144. See, e.g., Berroteran-Melendez v. INS, 955 F.2d 1251, 1254-55 (9th Cir.
1992).
145. 'see Arango-Aradondo v. INS, 13 F.3d 610, 614-15 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that
while the United States courts of appeals disagree as to whether jurisdiction is pre
cluded by a motion to reopen filed before a petition for judicial review, the courts agree
that a motion to reopen filed after a petition for review will not defeat appellate
jurisdiction).
146. 955F.2d at 1254-55.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 160-63 for the facts of Berroteran
Melendez.
148. Berroteran-Melendez, 955 F.2d a't 1254.
149. 722 F.2d 1442 (9th Cir. 1984). In Wall, the alien moved to reopen the BIA's
dismissal of his case after filing a petition for judicial review. Id. at 1443.
150. Id.
.
151. Berroteran-Melendez, 955 F.2d at 1254.
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After electing to exercise jurisdiction, the Berroteran-Melendez
court then considered whether it should follow Wall and hold the
case in abeyance pending the Board's disposition of the motion.152
According to the court, the decision to suspend appellate proceed
ings while awaiting the agency's ruling on the motion to reopen is
purely discretionary.153 Under Ninth Circuit law,
there is no substantive difference between the filing of a motion
to reopen before the petition for review, in which case the time
for filing the petition runs from the date of the decision on the
motion to reopen, and where a motion to reopen is filed after the
petition for review and the appellate proceedings are suspended.
The appellate process would not be further delayed. 154

The Berroteran-Melendez court recognized, however, that a suspen
sion of appellate proceedings effectively creates an automatic stay
of deportation while the motion remains unadjudicated. Such a re
sult would be inconsistent with the immigration regulations. 155
Thus, concluding that the potential for abuse outweighs concerns of
judicial efficiency, the court chose not to suspend its appellate pro
ceedings in this case. 156
Permitting concurrent jurisdiction in a case such as Berroteran
Melendez, however, contradicts the court's rationale .in its sus
pended finality cases. Those cases in which the pendency of a mo
tion to reopen rendered the deportation order nonfinal were
justified by a policy of judicial economy. The court declined juris
diction because it preferred to allow the administrative agency to
correct its own errors. By disallowing simultaneous jurisdiction, the
court avoided duplication and waste of administrative and judicial
resources. In a case such as Berroteran-Melendez, the court is will
ing to tolerate jurisdiction in both forums, for no apparent reason
152. Id. (citing Lozada v. INS, 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988)}. In Lozada, the appel
late proceedings were suspended pending the BIA's decision on the motion to reopen.
The merits were decided after the BIA denied the motion. Lozada v. INS, 857 F.2d 10,
12 (1st Cir. 1988). But see Figeroa v. INS, 886 F.2d 76, 77 n.1 (4th Cir. 1989) (merits
decided despite pending motion which was filed after petitioning for review).
153.. Berroteran-Melendez, 955 F.2d at 1254-55. For example, the Court of Ap
peals for the Third Circuit has refused to suspend its proceedings in this situation, con
sistent with its policy against delay in deportation. See Alleyne v. INS, 879 F.2d 1177,
1181-82 n.7 & 8 (3d Cir. 1989) and discussion beginning supra note 84.
154. Berroteran-Melendez, 955 F.2d at 1255.
155. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.8 (1994), supra note 31 ("The filing of a motion to reopen or
a motion to reconsider shall not serve to stay the execution of any decision made in the
case.").
156. Berroteran-Melendez, 955 F.2d at 1255.
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other than the timing of the motion to reopen. Yet nothing in the
INA or the regulations even suggests that the timing of a motion to
reopen has any bearing on finality. Whether the motion is filed
before or after the appeal, if the case is in both forums, the court's
judicial efficiency justification is undermined.
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit justifies Ber
roteran-Melendez as consistent with the statutory framework estab
lished by section 106(a) of the INA.1 57 For example, if the BIA
denies a motion to reopen, that denial could be judicially reviewed.
Section l06(a)(6) of the INA provides that any review sought with
respect to a motion to reopen must be consolidated with the review
of the underlying deportation order. 158 Assuming that 1) the alien
appeals the BIA's denial of his motion to reopen, and 2) the court
has not ruled on the deportation order when the denial of reopen
ing is appealed, the two reviews will be consolidated and heard to
gether by the court of appeals. Thus, the court insists that
Berroteran-Melendez is a case in which "an alien may validly seek
review of both the original BIA decision and the denial of his mo
tion to reopen. "159 This approach is consistent with the INA and
Ninth Circuit decisions.
Although Berroteran-Melendez is arguably consistent with the
court's legal theory, the case seems anomalous and the holding per
haps limited to its facts. The court observed:
While suspending proceedings would promote judicial efficiency,
... the potential for abuse of the process to circumvent the BIA's
discretionary power to grant or deny a stay of deportation pend
ing a motion to reopen outweighs concerns with efficiency. After
balancing these concerns in the factual context of this case, we
elect not to stay judicial proceedings. l60

The court did not explain its concern with superseding the BIA's
discretionary power, but it did set out the factual basis of the case.
The case involved a deportation decision affirmed by the BIA, a
petition for judicial review of the BIA's order of deportation, a mo
tion to reopen submitted to the BIA, and a motion to suspend judi
cial proceedings pendIng the BIA's decision. After the court
denied the motion to suspend judicial proceedings, the petitioners
filed a motion for reconsideration; that request for reconsideration
157.
158.
159.
160.

See Ogio v. INS, 2 F.3d 959, 960 (9th Cir. 1993) (per curiam).
8 U.S.C. § 1l05a(a)(6) (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Ogio, 2 F.3d at 960.
Berroteran-Melendez, 955 F.2d at 1255 (emphasis added).
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was also denied. 161
In short, the case was pending before the court with an out
standing request for agency reopening. The petitioners attempted
to rely on the Ninth Circuit's rule that a pending motion to reopen
suspends the finality of an order and precludes the cQurt's jurisdic
tion. They argued that the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
lacked jurisdiction over the appeai because of the unadjudicated
motion to reopen. The INS,162 however, argued that the court had
jurisdiction because the BIA's, dismissal of the administrative ap
peal was a "final order of deportation. "163 To the extent that aliens
cannot be deported on a nonfinal order of deportation, petitioners'
argument against the court's jurisdiction looks like an attempt to
buy time. Such attempts contravene the expressed congressional
policy· against delay in the deporta~ion process. By taking jurisdic
tion in Berroteran-Melendez, the court expressly disavowed judicial
efficiency as the controlling principle by which to guide these juris
dictional decisions. This nonreliance on judicial economy is an im
portant reason for finding the rule of Locomotive Engineers
inapplicable in immigration cases .
.Other reasons for rejecting the rule of Locomotive Engineers
include the more generous provisions of the INA as compared to
the Hobbs Act,164 and the fact that the Locomotive Engineers
Court did not deny jurisdiction because ofa pending administrative
motion. The Court stated that·a request for agency reconsideration
suspended the finality of an ICC order and tolled the running of the
Hobbs Act statutory period in which to petition for judicial review
of the underlying order. 165 The Court held, however, that both the
denial of the motion to reconsider and the underlying denial of the
petition for clarification were not appealable orders. 166 The Court
distinguished between motions to reconsider that are based upon
"material erroi"167. and those based upon "new evidence" or
161. Id. at 1253-54.
162. The court referred to the "BIA" argument to support jurisdiction under
§ 1105a(a). Id. at 1254. The BIA, however, was not a party to the action; rather, the
INS was a party. Id.
163. Id. This view is consistent with the regulations. See supra note 55 and ac
companying text for reference to the relevant regulations.
164. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
165. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482
U.S. 270, 284 (1987).
166. Id. at 277, 285.
167. A motion to reconsider on the ground of "material error" involves "the
same record that was before the agency when it rendered its original decision." Id. at
280.
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"changed circumstances."168 Denials of motions based upon new
evidence or changed circumstances are appealable. 169 The motion
at issue, however, was based upon material error, and the Court
concluded that "'an order which merely denies rehearing of ... [the
prior] order is not itself reviewable."'170 Similarly, the denial of the
petition for clarification was not an appealable order. Construed as
a motion to· reopen, it included no new evidence or changed
circumstances. 171
.
Ultimately, then, the Court denied jurisdiction because the or
ders were unreviewable; not because they were nonfi~aJ.172 Other
courts subsequently extended Locomotive Engineers to· preclude
appellate jurisdiction, reasoning that if an order is nonfinal for de
termining. when the time to appeal begins, it must be nonfinal ·and
nonappealable until disposition of the motion to reopen.173 This
suspension of finality rule thereby induces delay.
Thus, Locomotive Engineers is inconsistent with the immigra
tion policy goal of facilitating deportation once an alien's status has
been determined. Congress has expressly mandated that judicial
economy is subordinate to the goal of curbing the potential to delay
deportation. The United States Supreme Court demands that
courts give effect to the clearly expressed intent of the legisla
ture. 174 Therefore, if certain finality ruies facilitate the legislative
will, courts should adhere to them. Conversely, rules that. thwart
immigration policy ought to be repudiated.
C.

Suspended Finality Is Inapplicable in Immigration

The Courts of Appeals for the Third, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth,
and Tenth Circuits disagree that filing a motion to reopen or recon
sider suspends the finality of a deportation order and renders judi
cial review premature. These courts cite the immigration
regulations, which state that the BIA's order of deportation is final
on the date issued,175 except in certain specified cases. 176 The ex
168. Id. at 278-79.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 280 (quoting Microwave Communications, Inc; v. FCC, 515 F.2d 385,
387 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1974».
171. Id. at 285-86.
172. Id. at 287. See supra note 19 for a more complete discussion of this matter.
173. See supra note 21.
174. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984).
175. See 8 C.F.R. § 243.1 (1994), supra note 54.
176. See 8 C.F.R. § 3.1(d)(2) (1994), supra note 55.
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ceptions do not include cases in which motions to reopen or recon
sider are filed.
When filed, motions to reopen must state whether the chal
lenged order "has been or is the subject of any judicial proceed
ing."177 Concurrent jurisdiction can arise only where the finality of
a deportation order is intact and unaffected by a pending motion.
Filing a request for administrative reopening or reconsideration will
not stay deportation. 178 "These motions are . .. analogous to mo
tions for relief from judgment for mistake or for newly discovered
evidence," which leave the finality of judgments intact.179 In fed
eral civil cases, a party has one year in which to seek reopening, but
the motion "does not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend its
operation."18o Similarly, a "collateral habeas corpus attack," made
in a criminal case after exhaustion of direct appeals, has no effect
on a conviction's finality throughout the pendency of the action. 181
Aliens need not even file motions to reopen or reconsider, which
are granted only in the court's discretion. 182 The design of the regu
lations thus suggests that a BIA decision remains final and appeala
ble despite an unadjudicated motion to reopen.
In addition to the regulatory structure, the consequences of ad
hering to the rule of Locomotive Engineers illustrate how the sus
pended finality rule is misplaced in the immigration context. First,
it makes no sense to hold that the filing of a motion to reopen ren
ders the deportation order nonappealable but has no effect on final
177. 8 C.F.R. § 103.5(a)(1)(iii)(D) (1994) (emphasis added).
178. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
179. White v. INS, 6 F.3d 1312, 1315 (8th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 2162
(1994).
180. FED. R. CIv. P. 6O(b). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 33, providing that "[a]
motion for a new trial based on the ground of newly discovered evidence may be made
only before or within two years after final judgment, but if an appeal is pending the
court may grant the motion only on remand of the case." Id.
181. White, 6 F.3d at 1315.
182. According to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, the BIA appro
priately identifies the criteria it will use in exercising discretion to reopen cases:
The power to reopen a case ... is a power to dispense mercy. No one is
entitled to mercy, and there are no standards by which judges may patrol its
exercise. . .. In order to tell whether [the petitioner] ... deserves merciful
treatment, one must know not only the facts of her case but also the circum
stances of the tens of thousands of other aliens seeking relief. If the Board is
doing its job well, it is comparing the applicants against each other as well as
evaluating them under moral and prudential standards. That comparison en
tails the assessment of thousands of aliens who are invisible to judges when a
single alien seeks judicial review.
Achacoso-Sanchez v. INS, 779 F.2d 1260, 1265 (7th Cir. 1985).
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ity for purposes of deportation. Courts all seem to agree that
motions to reopen will not stay deportation, as is consistent with the
regulations. However, courts adhering to the suspended finality
rule deny appellate jurisdiction while the motion is pending before
the Board. It is inconsistent and impossible to hold that motions
will not delay deportation, but will suspend finality and deny the
court jurisdiction. By definition, postponing judicial review until
the BIA's disposition of the motion to reopen results in inevitable
delay of deportation.
Second, if a pending motion to reopen were to destroy finality
of the order so as to preclude only appellate jurisdiction, yet permit
deportation, an alien might be deported before ever obtaining judi
cial review. Once an alien departs the United States, he or she may
no longer seek either administrative rehearing or judicial review. 183
Third, if the possibility of reopening or reconsideration was al
lowed to negate finality, courts "would recognize no finality"184
other than the alien's actual departure from American soil. Such an
interpretation fosters abuse of the administrative and judicial
processes because it permits the mere filing of motions to reopen to
disrupt deportation. 185 Congress has expressly forbidden that op
tion. 186 "If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the
matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress."187
CONCLUSION

In sum, there are substantial reasons for holding that the final
183. 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(c) (1988); 8 C.F.R. § 3.2 (1994).
184. See Butros v. INS, 990 F.2d 1142, 1152 (9th Cir. 1993) (quotations and cita
tions omitted) (Trott, J., dissenting). The Butros majority held that the status of a peti
tioner for purposes of discretionary relief is not finally determined so long as the BIA
may reopen or reconsider the case. Id. at 1145. The dissent criticized the holding of
Butros as one that "raises more questions than it answers:"
Would a motion to reconsider the denial of a motion to reopen prevent the
quickening of finality? Will a series of such motions made by an alien fighting
deportation stave off the ripening of appellate jurisdiction under Chu? Will
these proceedings ever come to a conclusion? ... It would appear, as it does to
the INS, that this new rule "would recognize no finality (other than the 'physi
cal deportation' of the alien from the United States) to an alien's right to seek
reopening of deportation proceedings ...."
Id. at 1152 (citation omitted) (Trott, J., dissenting).
185. Sanctions for meritless filings are possible. See, e.g., Muigai v. INS, 682 F.2d
334, 337 (2d Cir. 1982) (attorney sanctioned for filing frivolous petition for review).
186. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
187. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984).
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ity and appealability of a deportation order remain unaffected by
the pendency of a motion to reopen or reconsider. This approach is
consistent with the immigration regulations, as well as congres
sional policies such as facilitating deportation and avoiding dilatory
practices. The Courts of Appeals for the Third, Sixth, Seventh,
Eighth, and Tenth Circuits each have rejected the suspended final
ity rule in imnugration iaw. These courts agree that filipg a motion
to reopen or reconsider should not be allowed to interfere with the
deportation process.
.
The fact that the regulations provide for reopening does not
mean that a petitioner will ~eet his or her burden to warrant such
relief.. It therefore makes more sense to say that the BIA decision
is final at least until ,tlie proceeding is iil fact reopened. Where a
motion to reopen is granted, the order is "nonfinal" to the extent
that a reopened proceeding has a real and not just theoretical possi
bility of culminating in a different result. It might then be prud~nt
for a court to hold the case in abeyance pending the outcome of the
reopened proceeding. While the motion to reopen remains
unadjudicated, however, there is no compelling reason to depart
from the immigration regulations, which state'that motions to reo
pen will not interfere with deportation. Accordingly; a final order
of deportation is appealable, despite a pending motion to reoperi.
Scott D. Camassar

